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Eminent Domain-Compensation for Cost of Preventing Future Damage to Land
Not Condemned-[Federal].-The United States constructed a dam across the Mississippi River. The dam caused the river to flood a strip of land comprising twenty-four
acres of the railroad's right of way. At maximum depth the water would stand against
the embankment which carried the railroad tracks for a distance of four miles. In an
action by the United States to condemn a flood way easement over the twenty-four
acres, the district court measured compensation by the value of the flooded land plus
those expenses necessarily incurred by the railroad to protect its embankment from
effects of the resultant saturation and erosion. The government appealed on the
ground that compensation should be limited to the value of the twenty-four acres actually flooded. Held, affirmed. U.S. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 82 F.
(2d) 131 (C.C.A. 8th 1936).
Authority adequately supports allowance of damages in addition to the value of the
land actually "taken." Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); Spokane FallsRy. Co. v.
Zeigler, x67 U.S. 65 (1897); U.S. v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. i8o (1911); Lewis, Eminent
Domain §§ 686, 710 (3d ed. 19o9); see 30 Ill. L. Rev. io63 (1936). However, the court's
general conclusion that, by judicial construction, the words "or damaged" have been
added to "taken" in the provision of the Fifth Amendment that no property shall be
taken for public purposes without just compensation must be viewed with some skepticism. The words "taken" and "property" are not clear concepts. See Cormack, Legal
Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L. J. 22X (i931); Eaton v. Boston
C. & M. R.R. Co., 5x N.H. 504 (1872). At present the federal courts seem to be in the
process of relaxing the degree of relation to a tangible res necessary to bring rights
within their notions of "property" for which compensation must be given. The early
requirement was that a tangible res be actually "taken" in the sense of a continuous
dispossession of the owner. Sedgwick, Statutory and Constitutional Law 519 (1857).
Complete destruction of utility accompanied by physical occupation in some manner
came to be recognized as a dispossession. .Pumpellyv. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. (U.S.)
i66 (1871); U.S. v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). More recently a partial reduction of
value caused by intermittent flooding his been held a "taking." U.S. v. Cress, 243
U.S. 316 (I917). When part of the land is "taken" in accordance with the above standards, just compensation includes the value of the intangible rights attached to it.
MonongahelaNavigation Co. v. U.S., 148 U.S. 312 (1893); U.S. v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333
(r91o); see U.S. v. Wheeler Twp., 66 F. (2d) 977 (C.C.A. 8th 1933). Dispossession of a
part of the same parcel of land was excuse for allowing recovery for damage to the
remaining part not taken. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); Spokane Falls Ry.
Co. v. Ziegler, i67 U.S. 65 (1897); U.S. v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 18o (19ii). The Supreme
Court has been reluctant to permit recovery for intangible property rights which have
been destroyed when no part of the tangible property was taken or invaded. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); Gibson v. U.S., i66 U.S. 269 (1897);
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (igoo). Two more recent cases have found a taking
when the surface of the property was invaded by an element which did not injure the
land but did interfere with intangible rights. U.S. v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 330 (1917)

(increased height of water in creek not overflowing the banks, but eliminating the
drop from a mill dam necessary to obtain power); PortsmouthHarborCo. v. U.S., 260
U.S. 327 (1922) (occasional gunfire over the land). Nevertheless the courts have preserved a distinction between a taking and mere consequential damages for which no
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compensation is required. Sharp v. U.S.,

19, U.S. 34, (I9o3); Bedford v. U.S., i92
U.S. 217 (1904); Christmanv. U.S., 74 F. (2d) 112 (C.C.A. 7th 1934) (criticized in the
instant case). See Manigaultv. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 484 (1905); Sanguinettiv. U.S.,
264 U.S. 146 (1924). The ambiguity of these terms is reflected in their uncertain application. See 32 Yale L. J. 725 (1923).
Policy and necessity require that the government be free to act without being liable
for the remote and unintended effects of its acts. Horstman Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 138
(r921); Jackson v. U.S., 230 U.S. i (1913). But further relaxation of the requirements
would seem proper and not unreasonably burdensome. See Cormack, Legal Concepts
in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L. J. 221, 259 (i931). The principal case by allowing recovery of the costs of preventing future damage has taken the natural step
beyond those decisions which permit recovery for the damage to the part remaining
caused by the use of the part taken. In a very recent decision, the Court of Appeals,
of the Seventh Circuit followed the instant case when apparently the physical taking
was much more limited. U.S. v. Wabasha-NelsonBridge Co. (C.C.A. 7 th, April 7, 1936,
not yet reported).

It might be inferred from the instant case that the rule of damages in actions against
the United States by property owners is different from that used in direct condemnation
proceedings brought by the government. Such a belief is unjustified. Jacobs v. U.S.,
290 U.S. 13 (x933); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932). As the sourceof theright
to compensation in either case is the fifth amendment, the damages should not vary as
a consequence of failure of the government to institute condemnation proceedings.
However, the right to sue the United States has been conferred and limited by the
Tucker Act, which gives federal courts jurisdiction "..... of all claims ....

founded

upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress .... or upon any
contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages,
liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort ..... " 24 Stat. 505 (1887),
28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1927). Thus, when the taking of land is regarded as tortious, recovery is denied. U.S. v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920); Langford v. U.S.,

ioi U.S. 341 (1879). When government officials are properly authorized to appropriate
land to which the government asserts no title, the government is said to promise impliedly to pay therefor and recovery is permitted. U.S. v. North American Co., 253
U.S. 330 (1920); U.S. v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U.S. 228 (1914); U.S. v. GreatFalls Mfg.
Co., i2 U.S. 645 (x884). Assertion of an implied promise seems a mere statement of

the conclusion that the government must pay. The courts have insisted that under the
Tucker Act no recovery on quasi-contractual grounds is permitted. Harleyv. U.S., igs
U.S. 229 (i9o5). Nevertheless in most cases of this type it is impossible to find the
elements of a consensual contract. Cf. 36 Harv. L. Rev. 866 (1923). Thus liability exists even though the legislation which results in the taking makes no provision for instituting condemnation proceedings. U.S. v. Great FallsMfg. Co., 11:2 U.S. 645 (1884);
U.S. v. Lynah, i88 U.S. 445, 465 (i9o3). The owner may recover in a later action despite his failure to consent at the time of the taking. Hersch v. U.S., I5 Ct. Cl. 385
(1879); see concurring opinion of Justice Brown in U.S. v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 476
(i9o3). Likewise where the taking was properly authorized, the failure of the government agents to intend that compensation should be made does not alter the
liability. Portsmouth Harbor Co. v. U.S., 26o U.S. 327 (1922). Reliance by the
courts upon the implied contract theory has led to a denial of recovery where the
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authorized act of taking wts accompanied by a mistaken assertion of a paramount
right in the government. Tempel v. U.S., 248 U.S. 121 (I918); Hill v. U.S., 149 U.S.
593 (1893). This unfortunate result would have been avoided if the courts had recognized "claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States" as a separate category under the Tucker Act. See minority opinions in Hill v. U.S., 149 U.S. 593, 6oo
(1893), and U.S. v. Lynah, i88 U.S. 445, 474 (1903).

Extradition-Immunity of American Citizens under Treaty with France-[Federal].
-The relators, citizens of the United States, had fled from Paris to the United States
to avoid arrest in connection with allegedly illegal financial operations. Upon the request of the French authorities, they were taken into custody by the respondent, a
United States commissioner. The case came before the Circuit Court of Appeals on
appeal from a ruling of the district court dismissing writs of habeascorpus. Article 5 of
the treaty with France declares: "Neither of the contracting Parties shall be bound to
deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this covenant." 37
Stat. 153o (1911). Held, this treaty does not give the Secretary of State authority to
deliver up an American citizen to France. Judgment of the district court reversed.
United States ex rel. Neidecker v. Valentine, 81 F. (2d) 32 (C.C.A. 2d 1936).
When an extradition treaty exists with a foreign country, and upon complaint by
the proper foreign authority, any United States commissioner is empowered under the
United States Code of Criminal Procedure (W1 Stat. 656 (1oo), i8 U.S.C.A. §65i
(1927)) to arrest and conduct hearings for persons charged with crime in the foreign
country and, upon deeming the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge, to certify the
case to the Secretary of State for a surrender to be made according to the terms of the
treaty. The sole question presented in the principal case was whether the treaty with
France authorized the Secretary of State, under any circumstances, to surrender
American citizens who have been charged with extraditable crimes in France and have
taken refuge in the United States. The factor which appears to have been chiefly instrumental in this decision is the persistent refusal of the French government to surrender its nationals to the United States under the same treaty. France has considered
that she is doing her part by prosecuting her nationals for crimes committed abroad.
This procedure is not possible under the Anglo-American territorial concept of legal
jurisdiction. i Bishop, Criminal Law § io9 (9th ed. 1923). Therefore, the question of
reciprocity seems to have been given much more weight by the court than a rational
consideration of the merits of the case would warrant. After an attempt to justify its
decision on the basis of the existing authority, i.e., chiefly, the opinions of two secretaries of state and the district court case of Ex parte McCabe (46 Fed. 363 (D.C.Tex.
1891)) which involved a similar treaty with Mexico, the court proceeded to reveal the
true basis of its decision in these words: " ....
nationalism is not dead, and most nations have shown a persistent repugnance to submit their citizens to foreign courts.
We have indeed an honorable record; but it is uncertain how far our diplomacy is prepared to give where it does not receive." Unfortunately it is true that most nations
have adopted this attitude. 93 Just. P. 822 (1929). It is even less justifiable in the case
of the United States, which does not punish its citizens for crimes committed abroad.
In the only Supreme Court decision on the subject it was held that a refusal by Italy
to deliver up her citizens under a treaty not excepting nationals, although ground for a

